1· Lattimore H-4 (no date) 1950 AI1 Sinkiang AI1

against the Tungans or Chinese Moslems, in order to obviate future rebellion. He employed many of his own relatives and supporters from Hunan Province in his administration, and this accounts for the fact that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century Hunan officials almost completely dominated the Sinkiang administration. While Tso regarded the Uighurs as rebels, he regarded the Tungans as traitors, because they were Chinese in language, and largely Chinese by descent. Partly out of hatred against them as traitors and partly in order to "divide and rule," Tso massacred the Tungans in great numbers but showed the greatest clemency to the Uighurs, the Kazakhs, and the Mongols.

Even after the conclusion of Tso's military campaigns in the Tarim Basin there were debates among high officials and in the Imperial Court as to the status of the reconquered region. Finally the view championed by Tso Tsung-t'ang was adopted by the Manchu Emperor. On November 18, 1884, an Imperial Edict was issued which made Sinkiang a province (*Hsin-chiang*, "the New Territory," or, as it is frequently translated, "New Dominion").[9] Urumchi, under the Chinese name of Ti-hua, was proclaimed the capital and more than twenty district administrations were organized.

The Chinese in this new province may be classified in four categories, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. First are the descendants of criminals and officials who were banished from China during the second half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth. Second are the families of military and civil officers in Sinkiang, mostly from Hunan, Yunnan, Kansu and the Northeastern (Manchurian) Provinces. Third are the merchants, including money-changers from Shansi, traders from the Tientsin area, and brick tea merchants from Hupeh and Hunan. Fourth are the peasants, whose immigration began in 1776, when an Imperial Edict provided for a subsidy for those who would settle in Sinkiang.[10]

[9] *Tung-hua hsü-lu*, 1*a*–1*b*, Kuanghsü 66; *Ta Ch'ing Te Tsung Ching Huang-ti Shih-lu*, 190, 27a–28a; and *Ch'ing Shih Kao, Pen-chi*, Vol. 23, 17a.

[10] Wang Hsien-chien, *Tung-Hua Lu* (Collection of State Papers), Imperial Edict of June, 1776.

The linguistic uniformity of the Uighur
Uighurs is only one aspect of

their general homogeneity. Almost the whole population is dependent upon agriculture and subsidiary occupations. The chief exception is a group known as Dulani who live in large part by animal husbandry along the banks of the Yarkand and Tarim Rivers. It may be that these are a people in the process of assimilation. Although they speak Uighur they are said to derive from the Kipchak tribe of the Middle Horde of the Kazakhs. (The main body of Sinkiang Kazakhs belong to the Eastern Horde.) Uncertainty as to the precise relationship of the Dulani is increased by the fact that their womenfolk wear a distinctive style of headgear which is quite similar to that used by Kirghiz women. A still smaller splinter of nonsedentary Uighur-speaking people are the Lopliks, who live in the area of Lob Nor and make their living largely by fishing.[21]

Apart from these groups the Uighur population as a whole lives either in farmsteads scattered in the fields or in houses ranged along the narrow streets of oasis cities and towns. The houses usually consist of mud-brick apartments grouped around open courtyards. In the summer much of the daily living is carried on in the open bazaars and on streets shaded by poplar trees and mat-covered trellises.

The Uighurs have a reputation for being indolent and pleasure-loving, with a special fondness for music, drama, and good eating. Ever since the time of Marco Polo the inhabitants of the Tarim Basin have been particularly noted for the casual relations between the sexes. Divorce is extraordinarily easy, temporary alliances are common, and the family as an institution is unstable to a degree unsurpassed among peoples of Islamic faith.

Religion has an uneven influence on the population. The most important positions in the Moslem Church are held by religious leaders who have inherited their posts from a long line of ancestors and most of whom are related to the large landowners and officials who dominate Uighur society. Not surprisingly, therefore, the upper strata of Uighur society include the most ardent supporters of Islam. The poorer classes are indifferent

[21] Katanov-Menges.

churchgoers and have a low opinion of the clergy. A common saying is, "Do what the mullah says, not what he does."

The intimate ties between the upper lay and ecclesiastical strata enhance the importance of religion. Such literary works as are possessed by the Uighurs are mainly of a religious or didactic character and both historical and contemporary Uighur literature stresses the role played by the church in the struggle of the Uighurs against oppression by the Chinese and earlier rulers.

2. OTHER NATIONALITIES WITH A TERRITORIAL BASE

Kazakhs. The Sinkiang Kazakhs, who officially number 318,716 people, share a common history with the Kazakhs of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic in the U.S.S.R.

As a separate nation they appear comparatively late in history. They were originally a part of the Ulus or heritage of Chagatai, one of the sons of Jenghis Khan, and then became part of the Uzbek Khanate, one of the successor states of the Ulus or appanage of Juchi, eldest son of Jenghis, called by the Russians the Golden Horde. The Uzbek Khanate suffered from constant friction among tribal Sultans and Princes. In the middle of the fifteenth century two Sultans of the Barak clan, which was the most powerful opponent of Abul-Khair, the ruling Khan, left the Uzbek confederation and migrated to the neighboring Khanate of Mogulistan, taking their tribal subjects with them. The Mogul Khan — who controlled the territory from east of Tashkent to Jungaria — hoping to find in them allies against his rivals the Uzbeks, ceded to them a stretch of grazing lands from north of the River Chu to west of the River Sary-su. The transformation of this small splinter group into a national and political unit was not accomplished until the end of the fifteenth century, when the Uzbeks conquered the southern oasis regions of Inner Asia and, through close contact with the sedentary oasis population, ceased to be pastoral nomads. At that time, several tribes separated from the Uzbek Khanate and remained in the northern steppes, joining the Kazakhs, whose border was thus moved far westward into what is today called the Kazakh steppe. The diverse tribal origin of the

everywhere in Inner Asia the Soviet frontier is in one sense artificial: because it originated in the Tsarist conquests, and stops where the Tsarist conquests stopped, it everywhere divides similar peoples from each other instead of separating different peoples from each other, as has been pointed out in previous chapters. The same languages are spoken on both sides of the Soviet-Turkish, Soviet-Iranian, Soviet-Afghan, and Soviet-Sinkiang frontiers. And, in most cases, they are spoken by people who are minorities under both the sovereignties under which they live. The effects in Inner Asia of the Soviet Revolution must therefore be studied especially from the standpoint of peoples who are minorities in the states under which they live, and who talk in the same language and against the background of a common cultural and social tradition about the different conditions under which they live on the two sides of the frontier that divides them. Five principal phases, which followed each other in chronological order, can be distinguished among the long-term effects of the Soviet Revolution.

1. As the possessors of advanced skills, refugees from the Soviet Revolution became an elite in Sinkiang. Among the Russians, especially, there were doctors, geologists, and other scientists; engineers, mechanics, and many artisans. Among the Uzbeks, Tatars, and others there were also many whose literacy, skill, and experience in trade — or proficiency as carpenters, builders, leather tanners, or metalworkers — put them above the average level prevailing in Sinkiang. Having escaped from the disorder and insecurity of revolution, they now found that the country to which they had come was culturally and politically even more backward than the one from which they had escaped. They learned that if the superior skills which gave them the qualities of an elite were not enough to make them a political elite, and frequently not enough even to assure them economic security, it was because of the backwardness of the society in which they had settled, and the corruption or incompetence of the officials to whom they now had to defer.

2. Having fled because there was no force in Russian Inner

SN 311 The newest development, found in the Northwest, especially in Sinkiang, is the partial industrialization of those areas which are the sources of coal, oil, gold, iron, alum, quartz, gypsum, nitrates, salt, and, as recently reported, uranium.

SN 563 The non-Chinese peoples of the Northwest are not only outnumbered b ut also outweighed in economic and political respects. For more than two thousand years, the Chinese have been ruling those areas (with short interruptions as far as Sinkiang and Chinghai are concerned), even though they never had more than a few garrisons stationed in frontier areas. Those garrisons made it possible for a thin stratum of Chinese officials to rule the areas on the top level. On the lower level, the indigenous peoples and tribes governed themselves - under the supervision of the Chinese viceroys or governors and their bureaucracy.

SN 175 642 177 631 The general policy of the Chinese government in Peking was to make use of the existing form of governmental institutions of frontier areas like Sinkiang, Chinghai, and Inner-Mongolia. In Sinkiang (prior to 1884 it was called "Hui-chiang," i.e., Muslimic Dominion), two types of local government had existed: the Muslimic type and the Mongolian type. The [171] Northern and Northeastern part of Sinkiang, where the Mongols were the dominant inhabitants, had the same governmental institutions as Outer and Inner-Mongolia, namely, banners ruled by dzasaks, who were appointees of the Emperor in Peking. The Republic of China tacitly recognized their ranks [668] and interfered very little with their functions. Only Communist [565] China deprived the nomad aristocracy of their titles and rights.

The Muslimic communities were fuled by Bäks with various 175 631 795 649 657 ranks: the Ak'im Bäk, "local governor"; the Ishkhan Bäk, "assistant governor"; the Shang Bäk, "collector of revenue"; the Qazi, "judge"; the Kukbashi or Mirabu Bäk, "superintendant of agriculture"; Yüzbashi, "hundred-men-leader"; Onbashi, "ten-men-leader"; etc. All the local Bäks were appointed by the emperor or later on by the president of the Republic upon the recommendation of the Imperial or Republican governor, although it must be stated that some governors of Sinkiang, Chin Shu-jen and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, ruled and governed the province without asking Peking for the consent of appointments.

SN 175 631 647 [202] Besides the Chinese civil service there existed Chinese military staffs and detachments, centered in Ili, Urumchi, Kulja, Chuguchak, Kashghar, Sining, Su-chou, Lan-chou, etc. Relay stations provided communication between the government in Peking and the frontier areas. Maintaining the effectiveness of the means of communications was an important duty of 000 Chinese officials. Only since 1930 have some automobile highways been built, and the Communist regime, in cooperation

of the average Chinese seems to be fatalistic, considering Providence or Heaven to determine his fortune in life. In general, the average Chinese is rather indifferent in religious matters, although he might be sensitive if someone looked askance on his belief in local spirits, demons, and gods, but this is merely a matter of tradition rather than religion.

The Chinese is strongly individualistic and usually dislikes to be ordered around and governed; he ardently defends his own opinions. His inclination for social groupings is obvious. Wherever Chinese live, they soon form integrated communities and at times of distress or in critical situations they are ready to help each other collectively, a characteristic tendency found especially within the extended family, which as a rule feels itself responsible as a whole for debts, misdeeds, etc., of any member. The Chinese are reported to be basically anti-militaristic, although this may be more a traditional attitude of the literati than a sound fact, considering only the last fifty years of Chinese history. However, a Chinese proverb says, "From good iron do not make nails; from good men do not make soldiers." To toil his fields in peace, to make a living this way, and to raise his children, whom he deeply loves, and not to be interfered with by state and government, can be described as the average conception of the "good life." The average Chinese of the Northwest lives in simple mud or stone houses (in the Yellow River area, caves of the adjacent loess hills), stove, k'ang, and ancestor altar being almost the only furniture.

Culture, art, and literature were primarily fostered by the richer merchants, land and water owners, and, or course, the officials and scholars. These groups represented, up to 1949, an economically powerful class who owned a considerable part of the land and the water rights. Chinese officials of the frontier provinces had a reputation for being extremely money-minded. The Chinese gentry, consisting of former officials and degree holders, who were in many cases at the same time holders of land or watter rights, have been abolished as a class, while large parts of the academic strata, the intelligentsia, became more or less the Communist avantgarde of China, showing the same phenomenon which appeared in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, etc., before and during the Second World War, where the intelligentsia showed a deep inclination towards Communism.

In regard to the nomadic minorities of the Northwest (Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Mongols and Tibetans) the dominant social motives are two fold, and can be subdivided into an economic and a religious one, equally strong. The whole economic life of the nomads is centered around their livestock. The nomad's life

614 563 common migrations, and military alliance, was forced to unite into a large grouping. Clan solidarity is extremely strong. Even after the old tribal constitution was abolished in Soviet Russia, workers of the same kholkhoz felt they belonged to a new clan and observed clan exogamy, which, in this case of course, had no genetic basis.

The oldest clans emerged many centuries ago and were named after totem-animals, or after famous tribal leaders (e.g., Özbeg Khan after whom the Uzbeks are named). Some of the Kirghiz clan names of totemistic origin are bugu "stag", sary bagish "yellow elk", chong bagish "great elek", etc. Among Turkomans one finds many clan names of totemistic origin, e.g., ak okuz "white ox", qara okuz "black ox", ailar "bear", burgut "hawk", due "camel", kulan "wild donkey". The aul, great-aul and clan are all connected by [602] [621] blood relationships real or imagined. The feeling of kinship is highly developed, and manifests itself in mutual assistance in military activities and in cases of cattle losses due to theft, disease, or lack of precipitation.

The clan assumes joint responsibilities for the welfare of the whole group, in general, and for the deeds committed by individual members of the clan. [672] The clan also takes collective action in cases of theft or murder suffered by any clan members. [681] Grazing land is never individual property but belongs to the aul, great-aul or clan. [423] Bäks and khans form the nobility which is called aq süyek "white bone" in contrast to the commoners who are called qara süyek "black bones". [565]

563 565 Most members of the nobility claim to be descendants of Chinghis Khan and a considerable number of the bäks and khans undoubtedly belong to the old steppe aristocracy. However, a wealthy patriarch, with a reputation for being a fair judge, who was chieftain of a numerically rich aul or great aul could become a tribal leader by popular consent.

The white bones regard marriage between white bones and black bones as unsuitable.

[567] In addition to the white bones and the black bones there exists a third stratum, consisting of descendants of slaves who were officially freed during the middle of the last century. They do not own herds, not even single heads of cattle, but function as shepherds, farmhands, servants, etc. However, some cases are known of poor farmhands (after the abolition of slavery in Russia in 1857 which affected the tribes living athwart the Sino-Russian border so that they too decided to abolish the institution of slavery about 1869) gradually acquiring cattle and therefore ascending into the higher stratum.

563 622 The Kirghiz are not ruled by a bäk or a khan, but by elders whose functions, however, are identical with those of the bäks and khans. The elders "manap" are elected by popular acclaim, and they, in turn, fall under the leadership of an aga-manap

B. The Western (Oirat) Mongols (See also IMAR, Social Structure)

563 175 After the decline of the Mongolian Empire in the 14th century, the Western Mongols (the tribes Choros, Khoit, Khoshut and Torgut) of Dzungaria established the so-called Oirat Federation. [671] Its social structure is best summarized in the Oirat codex Chaghajachi yin bichik "Book of the Judges", based on the Jassa of Chingis Khan.

563 596 [595] [671] [851] Life within the extended family is absolutely patriarchal. Although polygyny is not mentioned in the codex it is an accepted part of the society. The children of concubines are legitimate. The order of precedence among the children depends on the social status of their mothers.

563 428 After the father's death, the eldest son inherits everything, including the father's wives and concubines with the exception of his own mother. Inheritance as well as descent follows the male line.

563 614 583 Among the Western Mongols clan exogamy is strictly observed, especially among the Torguts and Khoshuts of Sinkiang. Marriage entails the payment of a bride-price of at least two horses, two cows and twelve sheep. The bride-price for an aristocratic girl is considerably higher and consists of several dozen camels, horses and sheep. If a wife is divorced she is not permitted to take with her anything which has been given to her by her husband.

563 631 According to the Chaghajachi-yin bichik the Oirats were organized into ail, khoshun (banners) and aimak. In Sinkiang there are two khoshun of Torguts, one khoshun of Khoshuts and seven khoshun of Uriangkhai. The Khoshuts of the Alashan Area and the Torguts of the Edsin Gol Area each constitute one khoshun. Each khoshun lives on land and pastures with well-defined boundaries.

563 565 The same source details the various strata of Oirat society. It subdivides the entire Oirat population into three groups. The nobility (taiji) belong to the first group, the darkhans (soldiers, warriors, flag-bearers who are tax-exempt people) belong to the second group, and the kara kümüm (plebians) belong to the third group. Cutting across these other divisions is the highly respected group of monks (Llama, Ho-brog or pandit) who are also tax-exempt.

563 565 554 The Oirat princes are subdivided into six different ranks: a) Ch'in-Wang b) Chün-Wang c) Beile c) Beise d) Chen-kuo-kung and f) Hu-kuo-kung. The Oirat taijis have four ranks, e.g., the ruling leader of a khoshun who is called khoshun-u jasak is a taiji of the first rank. Besides these ranks honorary titles exist such as: erdeni "jewel", darkhan "master", tüsiyetü "pillar, support", daiching "hero", dalai "ocean" and batur "hero" etc. The Khoshun-u jasak is the ruler of his banner. Commoners [651] pay him tribute in the form of cattle or agricultural products.

S
563 In administering the khoshun, the khoshun-u jasak appoints an aide
631 who is called tusalakchi taiji. The administration of the military affairs of a khoshun rests in the hands of the jakirokchi and his aide who is called meiren-i janggin. After the death of the khoshun-
S u jasak his eldest son inherits the title and position. The aristo-
• [565] cracy and the clergy are highly respected by the kara kümün. The members of the Oirat aristocracy belong to very old Mongolian clans "otoks" which repeatedly had intermarried with Manchu or Tibetan aristocratic clans.

S [668] The Communist Government in Peking has abolished the rights
[565] and titles of the Mongol aristocracy of Sinkiang, Chinghai and Kansu.
[177]

C. The Nomadic Tibetans

N In terms of race, religion, language and origin, the nomadic
*563 and the sedentary Tibetans are fundamentally one people. Yet the
184 great difference in subsistance economy has produced too many distinctive cultural traits to permit discussion of the Chinghai Tibetans as a whole. In recognition of this cleavage, the sedentary Tibetans will be discussed separately as part of the general sedentary population.

N The basic unit of social organization is the encampment or
*563 "tent-circle" comprising a group of households from five to eighty
621 or more, who band together for cooperation and protection. Within
[592] the encampment the households may represent related families but this is not necessarily the case. Frequently the encampment's population will have been augmented by sedentary Tibetans who have chosen life in the steppes. Moreover, changes in affiliation do occur, so that one or more tents from one group may secede
N and join another encampment. According to Ekvall (1939) most
[622] frequently the actual authority rests in the hands of the rgan-po (elders), who are men of substance and influence. There also is an individual titular head, formally selected, who acts as spokesman for the group.

N Membership in the individual black tent consists of the man,
*563 his wife and their offspring. If the sons are married, they and
592 their wives sometimes are included as members of the tent. Occasionally also the husband of a daughter will live with his wife's people. However, a statistical survey by Yü Hsiang-wen revealed that 38 per cent of the tents housed a nuclear family. In addition to those linked by birth and marriage, the tent's members may include one or several servants or hanger-on who help in the work in return for the protection and hospitality of the tent. Perhaps
N it would be more accurate to say that the tent's inhabitants con-
[562] sist of the woman and her husband because the wife is the master
[422] of the tent and of its contents, just as she is the master of the products of the herds, although the husband owns the tent and the
000 herds. In those cases where a man has more than one wife, each

/The New Uighurs/

563 out clearly by the Orkhon inscriptions in which the Khaqan com-
121 plains bitterly of the Turkic susceptibility to Chinese culture,
175 and the rapid sinification of his people. In this sense, sinification meant that the Turkic tribes gradually gave up their nomadic life and settled in more permanent camp sites. These events had strong repercussions on Turkic social structure, which moved from kinship to function and territory. After the New Uighurs had been expelled from their ancestral lands by the Kirghiz in 840 A.D. they settled around the Tarim Basin. They had to
[177] abandon their nomadic way of life and to learn Chinese irriga-tion practices in order to survive and to maintain a certain level of productivity.

563 Thus the New Uighurs established what may be called an
175 irrigation civilization. Class lines in New Uighur society became more flexible. Whereas noble status was based on descent in
565 the nomadic era, high social prestige and, therefore, high
554 status was now attained by wealth gained through efficient labor and irrigational practices. Nearly all the irrigation canals were dug by collective effort. However, the actual water right of each farmer was in proportion to the quantity of labor he contributed to the digging. Irrigation regulation was entirely a matter of self-government. The Mirab, or keeper
[624] of the registry and person in charge of water distribution, and his assistant the Kokbeshi, were chosen by the village. This meant considerable social mobility, though traces of a more rigid class structure remain. For example, the Aqsaqal is the successor to the former tribal chieftain, but unlike the former he is chosen from among the villagers, and his office
[771] is not hereditary as was that of the tribal leader. Class lines based on racial distinctions do not exist among the New Uighurs, since the unifying factor in the society is not race but religion.
[582] Should a New Uighur marry a Chinese woman, she becomes a member of the community by "baptism."

563 The following distinctions may be noted in the New Uighur
565 class system as a whole:

[423] 1. About two-thirds of the New Uighur population belongs to the small peasantry, holding title to one to three acres of irrigated land. On rare occasions a small peasant may till up to thirty acres. Politically, this social stratum has little or no power, unless they participate as a group in a mass movement.

[423] 2. About one-eighth of the New Uighur population belongs to the "landed gentry" holding title to fifty or more acres. All their land usually is rented to tenant farmers, who pay the landlord up to eighty per cent of the land's produce. Politically, this segment of the New Uighur class structure is the strongest, or at least it was, prior to 1949. Usually the communal leaders are elected from this segment of the population.

/The New Uighurs/

563 565 A small percentage of these landlords have invested their wealth exclusively in irrigation projects since water constitutes the most profitable commodity.

563 565 793 [801] 3. The rest of the New Uighur population is subdivided into the following social groupings: a. The clergy (Muezzin, Iman, Mullah, etc.) constitutes a very important segment of the social structure. In its hands the education of the youth rested up to 1949, and it played an important role in shaping the character of the community. As the representatives of the mosque, they are not only the spiritual leaders of the community, but they are also the administrators of the land belonging to the mosque.

563 565 795 [423] This land came into the possession of the mosque as bequests from pious Moslems. Thus, the mosque is not only a spiritual, but also an economic, center. In addition, the mosque serves as a social welfare institution, in that it cares for all those persons of the community who are unable to make a living.

563 565 441 b. The merchants constitute the last segment of the New Uighur class structure. After the Arab conquest of Inner Asia, the merchants enlarged and promoted existing trade centers, thereby acquiring greater wealth and influence. It is noteworthy that most merchants in the Northwest are Moslems. In their hands rest not only most economic activities, but also the dissemination of Turkic and Arab culture. In the merchant ranks, the Chinese found willing and able officials who enjoyed the same privileges as did the Chinese administrators. However, in the Moslem uprisings, these officials aligned themselves with the Moslem population, and often assumed leadership in these movements of rebellion against the Chinese rulers. It may be presumed that to a large extent the Moslem uprisings in the Northwest were incited by the merchants.

563 [591] Among the New Uighurs residence is bilocal. Dwellings are usually occupied by extended families who either form an economic unit, or work as individuals or a family group on the fields or irrigation projects of a wealthy landowner. Polygamy [595] is practiced by the wealthier Moslems, especially the merchants [556] of Sinkiang, who have wives at different trading centers and therefore become the masters of several family units. The [851] children resulting from these marriages are all treated as [428] equals. Inheritance follows the rules of primogeniture. In [562] contrast to the nomadic peoples of Sinkiang, whose women occupy a relatively high and valuable position, the women of the sedentary peoples of the same area, the Turkic women, are held in low esteem. The Sinkiang nomad must buy his bride

/Sedentary Moslems of Sinkiang/

The focus of the family is on the sons, who above all provide the continuity of the family, and also aid the family economically before they establish their own households. Among the lower classes, daughters also often are very desirable. There is always a chance that a daughter, particularly if she is good-looking, will bring a wealthy husband to the family. The family expects nothing of their son after the age of 15 or 16 when he marries and sets up a household for himself.

A statement can be made, applying particularly to the sedentary Turkic Moslems in Sinkiang, that the relationships within the family are not as fixed and close as they are in China proper. This is due mainly to the factor that the institution of the family as a whole is loosely bound and unstable. Membership in the family nucleus changes often with the frequent conclusions and dissolutions of marriages. A great degree of permanency exists among the agricultural population, but most of the city-dwellers are subject to constant permutations.

The Islamic relationships between husband and wife are the basic patterns existing in Sinkiang, but they have been modified by local customs, and are less rigid and extreme in severity.

The husband-wife relationships are not based on equality, legal or otherwise. The differences in the family positions of the husband and wife are mainly a manifestation of the general attitudes toward men and women in Islamic society. A woman is considered a weak and irresponsible being, who is subject to impulses and whose behavior is largely irrational. Man, being the superior of the two, is given the authority and place of importance within the family. Islamic law, which established the man as leader and head of the family, obliges him not to misuse his power and to be generous to those who depend on him. In practice, the prerogatives accompanying the husband's superior position are often abused for his own advantage.

In Sinkiang the women's position is not as low as in other Moslem centers. The wife enjoys some rights which give her a certain degree of independence and freedom. Under certain circumstances, which will be discussed later, she can obtain a divorce on her own initiative, and she has some property rights. According to Islamic law her foremost obligation is to respect and honor her husband. Obedience to the husband is stressed in theory but is not as fully practiced. Women here participate in economic life to a greater degree than in most Moslem countries, and have some rights themselves. Consequently, they also enjoy a better social status. The Moslem women of Sinkiang appear with their husbands in the presence of male visitors, while in other Moslem countries they are forbidden to appear in the presence even of their husband's father or his elder brother. In Sinkiang a woman frequently leaves the house unaccompanied, without asking the

563 593 early age, and during their stay at home they are occupied in different phases of the household.

563 592 565 184 The families of the lower classes often comprise economic units, particularly among the farmers, artisans, and small merchants. The family as a whole is engaged in the economic tasks of gaining a livelihood. The father trains his sons to assist him in his profession, and eventually to take over and inherit their father's place. The father thus need not hire any assistants, but gets the necessary aid from his own family. Usually one son stays with his father, while the others, when they are old enough to establish their own households, go and seek their fortunes elsewhere. But while belonging to the nuclear family, all the sons participate in the economic activities.

The well-to-do families do not, as a rule, comprise such units of production. Some of the sons may be studying and training for future positions as officials, while others may actively participate in their father's business.

563 592 565 184 86 [801] Most families in the lower brackets, i.e., the majority, cannot afford to send their sons to schools; they cannot afford the fees, nor spare the time in which their sons might be participating in the economic activities. Thus the family takes upon itself the additional tasks of educating the children and teaching them the religious customs and rituals, and social manners. The child learns how to perform the most basic rituals of the Moslem religion, to recite a few prayers in Arabic, and to behave according to the local social customs and standards.

563 602 Larger kin groupings are hardly existent among the Turkic sedentary population of the Northwest. Since the family unit's ties are so loose, it is impossible to maintain relationships with relatives who do not belong to the immediate family. No ties of everyday life keep them together, and no economic obligations are required from relatives, other than the most immediate ones. In the well-to-do families, there might be some additional ties involving property and inheritance, but otherwise there is little closeness in the relationships of the members of the clan.

563 593 684 [593] The immediate family is the only social unit to which the individuals feel loyal and attached. However, under the circumstances, these attachments are not too strong. This may constitute one of the main reasons that adultery and lack of loyalty to a spouse are not as severely regarded as they are by the orthodox Moslems.

[586] [587] With the loose laws of marriage and divorce in Sinkiang, many incidents of possible adultery are prevented because the husband and wife are able to attain a legal separation and remarry. Where cases of adultery do occur, the women are the main subjects for punishment. The husband of an adulteress is entitled to punish his wife and to cease to treat her kindly. There is not much that a woman can do to a man if he has switched his loyalty.

/Western Mongols or Torguts/

As
563 their forefathers had much contact with the Russians and the
177 Chinese, they are more or less influenced by the culture and civilization of both. The Chinese influence appears to be the strongest.

563 Largely nomads, the West Mongols live a life similar to that
233 of their nomad brothers of Inner Mongolia. Only as a last resort
[171] do they abandon tent life and take up agriculture.
[241] The nobles who live in cities dwell in houses that are a com-
563 bination of Tibetan and Occidental architectural style, flat-
565 roofed, whitewashed, and with walled-in courtyards. Like the
369 Chinese, they sleep on k'angs. One often finds Russian furniture
342 in the house, Chinese embroideries decorating the walls, and
177 red silk draperies with Mongolian mottoes.
[352] The ordinary people wear long gowns of Chinese cut, but the
[353] customary Mongolian sash and equipment (see clothing section
563 of IMAR Handbook). A young man wears a long gown with a
291 sleeveless velvet waistcoat on top. Formerly, the officials
177 wore silk robes of Chinese cut, and the decorative cap of Imperial times with a peacock feather to signify the position of chieftainship. Nowadays they wear a Chinese style long gown with a sleeved jacket (ma-kua).

563 Food of the West Mongols is similar to that of other nomadic
233 peoples, but when the rich entertain, the cuisine is a combina-
556 tion of Mongolian, Chinese and Russian styles.
177

HEALTH AND SANITATION

I. Introduction

For the purposes of this section the region has been divided into three groups: (1) the Turkic people of Sinkiang (including the Eastern Turks, Kirghiz and Kazakhs), (2) the Tibetans of Chinghai and (3) the Chinese of the Northwest (including both Hans and Moslems).

Measured by Western standards, the area as a whole lacks most modern facilities for maintaining high standards of health and sanitation. The shortage of trained personnel in the fields of medicine, dentistry and nursing is quite acute. These conditions may be due partly to the geographical location of the area, being in the deep hinterland, away from the center of China, and generally lacking a sufficient water supply. The common man's ignorance of the basic facts of health and sanitation contributes greatly to the spread of disease and to the lack of precautionary measures against the occurrence of certain diseases.

However, the local population, while living under what we consider unsanitary conditions, has built immunities to many diseases, to which a Westerner, living under the same conditions, would easily succumb. Some habits that we consider dangerous in spreading disease may actually be without any harmful consequences to the local people.

II. The Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang

A. The Diet of the Turkic People

The daily diet of the sedentary Eastern Turkis consists mostly of mutton and rice, with vegetables, both boiled and fried, including onions, potatoes, turnips, carrots and spinach, many forms of soups, and pilaus. Tea is the staple beverage, served with sugar and without milk. Bread, in the shape of circular rolls indented at the top, constitutes an important item in the diet. A variety of fruits, including melons, apples, pears, apricots, peaches, nectarines, pomegranates, plums, cherries, and mulberries, grow in profusion in Turkestan and are abundant during the summer.

The common people eat only twice during the day; in the morning and in the evening. The wealthy people frequently have feasts and eat a great abundance and variety of foods. Many of them suffer from abnormal obesity as a result of overeating and lack of exercise. A common proverb in Sinkiang warning against the folly of this type of behavior is the following, "He who eats sparingly eats ten times, but he who eats too much eats but once."

The diet of the Kirghiz and the Kazakhs, the nomadic Turks, differs somewhat from that of the sedentary Eastern Turks. Their diet is composed mainly of milk and mutton. From flour and

181 is "istiklal" which is actually an Arabic loan word. Istiklal means
183 both freedom and independence. Along with the nomadic concep-
(192) tion of the freedom of movement in the vast steppes, there is also a reflection of the concept of political independence and being one's own master. The 19th and 20th centuries brought additional asso-
181 ciations to the word freedom. Along with the rise of nationalistic
183 aspirations, which resulted indirectly from the similar movements
668 in Europe, some Western ideas and notions have reached Turkes-
177 tan indirectly also. Though the Western full concept of freedom and democracy is not comprehended among the majority of the people of Eastern Turkestan, it has added more depth and breadth to the concept of freedom. The awareness of the need for political freedom has grown in Sinkiang in the last century. Sinkiang's history in this period indicates the strong desires and wishes of its people to be free of Chinese rule, or any other foreign domination. The Turkic people strongly resent and resist the encroachment on their freedom of action and political decision. This feeling of resentment is not only experienced by the more sophisticated sedentary population, aspiring for political independence, but is also shared by the nomadic people. The Communists have made attempts to either encroach on their freedom of movement in their searches for pasture land, or have completely attempted to sedentarize them. Thus, not only the economic existence of the nomads is threatened, but the freedom characteristic of their way of life is in danger also. The Communists have not only arrested the political freedom of the Turks and their desires for independence, but have also touched on their traditional values associated with their nomadic past, and threatening the existence of the nomads today.

H. Attitude toward Change

177 There are elements of both resistance and of desire for change
178 among the Eastern Turkis. The dominating social and economic
565 classes - consisting of the wealthy merchants (the Türks call them 'pek mühim ve zengin tüccar' , verbatim: "the very important and rich merchants'), landowners (Türk: Emlak sahibi), and clergy (Türk: Rahibler) - opposed change which threatened to undermine their social and material status. The general population aspired to raise their social position and standards of living, but at the same time did not wish to lose their leaders to whom they have always looked for direction and guidance. There is no question that no section of the society aspired to a forced, radical type of change for which they were not prepared. This type of change in the social structure, the complete leveling off of the social classes, with only the party hierarchy in a superior position, which was forced down on the population by the Communists, is an artificial product for which the Turkic society was not ready, nor willing to inflict upon itself.

181 /Turks of Sinkiang/
721 and the Turkis are likely to make untrustworthy soldiers.
779

J. Material Concepts

556 One of the most important standards according to which an
183 individual's place in society was measured in Sinkiang was the
extent of his wealth (Türk: zenginlik). The wealthy merchants
[565] and landowners for centuries occupied the leading positions in
society, while those who lacked property, the poor and the beggars,
were at the bottom of the social ladder. Wealth was considered
as a sign of God's blessings (Türk: Allahin nimetleri) and of the
individual's earthly wisdom. A man of property commanded poli-
tical power as well as an important position in society, while a
man who had been reduced to poverty lost all his prestige.
Poverty was considered a disaster, as the following folk song
[135] indicates:
[539]

"My horse is gone from before me,
My whip is no more at my side.
Even though this be my native land
Poverty is come upon me."

(C.P. Skrine, Chinese Central Asia, p. 208)

From the Communist propaganda, it seems their intention is
556 to eliminate the wealthy classes. It is difficult to tell how many
668 of the leading property owners have become influential under the
177 present regime as "Communist" leaders, and how many have been
[565] truly eliminated. If Communist doctrines are truly pursued, a
new attitude in regard to property, will have to be developed. The
association of property with the individual will cease, since the
property will be transferred to the ownership of the state. We
have indications that such a transformation has not fully occurred.
The leadership of the Moslem community, however, has been
transferred from its wealthy members to the party officials.
An individual cannot aspire any more for advancement in terms
of gathering more property, but only in terms of becoming an
important party member.

815 As regards science (Türk : bilgi, verb. 'knowledge', the term
668 is as old as recorded Türkic history) there was not much of it p
177 prior to the Communist revolution. The only type of knowledge
prevalent among the population was the knowledge of religion, of
Islam, and the scholars of the Turkic community were its Islamic
scholars, and not those versed in secular education. However,
with the dependence of the new regime on the new regime of
science and scientific achievements (sometimes the term science
corresponds to what we mean by it, and often it is used to em-
brace much more), a new emphasis has been put on the sciences.
There are very few among the Turkic people in Sinkiang who are
familiar with any of the sciences, and therefore there still is no
basic attitude or reaction to the world of science. It is regarded
with mixed curiosity, admiration and fear. The term "science"

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668 Article 51: Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where
641 national minorities are concentrated and various kinds of autonomy
642 organizations of the different nationalities shall be set up according to the size of the respective populations and regions. In places where different nationalities live together and in the autonomous areas of the national minorities, the different nationalities shall each have an appropriate number of representatives in the local organs of political power.

Article 53: All national minorities shall have freedom to develop their dialects and languages, to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and religious beliefs...

In the Constitution of 1954 the articles 3, 53, 54, 60, 67-72, 77, and 86 refer to the minorities. Some statements in these articles are very concrete, such as:

"Article 68: In all autonomous regions, autonomous chou and autonomous counties where a number of nationalities live together, each nationality is entitled to appropriate representation on the organs of self-government.

Article 71: In performing their duties, organs of self-government of all autonomous regions, autonomous chou and autonomous counties employ the spoken and written language or languages commonly used in the locality.

Article 77: Citizens of all nationalities have the right to use their own spoken and written languages in court proceedings. The People's Courts are to provide interpretation for any party unacquainted with the spoken or written language commonly used in the locality.

In an area where people of national minorities live in compact communities or where a number of nationalities live together, hearings in people's courts are conducted in the language commonly used in the locality, and judgments, notices and all other documents of the people's courts are made public in such language."

Others are more vague, such as articles 3, 67, 70 and 72. Contrary to Article 4 of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic of the early 1930's, which stated that the minority groups "may either join the Chinese Soviet state or secede from it and form their own state as they may prefer," the Constitution of 1954 denies the right of secession. It says in clear and definite words: "National autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China." (Article 3). Before further analysis can be made, some essential data help reveal the Communists' policy in practice toward the minorities in the Northwest.

S
563 B. Class Barriers vs. Nationality Barriers
423 1) "Comrade Editor:
431 In November, 1952, when the six 'land-reform experimenting
• 565 hsiang' in the 5th district of Sui-ting County were 'distributing the
668

563 fruit of struggle' there were more landlords and more fruits in the
423 1st hsiang than the 6th hsiang where both the landlords and fruits
431 were few. The laboring people of the 1st hsiang passed to the
565 peasants of the 6th hsiang fruits valued to 400 buckets (hu) of wheat
668 and 3,000 mou (about 500 acres) of rice paddies for distribution. The peasants of the 6th hsiang were deeply moved and wept. The 6th hsiang originally was a Kazakh area. When the Russians, Chinese Uighurs, Mongols of the 1st hsiang...drove carts loaded with fruits to the hsiang, the Kazakh fellow-citizens were so happy that they jumped up and down and ran to the side of the carts. They hugged the Russians and kissed them. They stuck out their thumbs before the Chinese (a gesture of approval) and yelled 'A-k'ang' (i.e. elder brother). They danced with the Uighurs and the Mongols.

At the same time, when the 6th hsiang classified the people, they found that there were 2 Chinese landlords, 1 Uighur landlord and 4 Kazakh landlords. People suddenly realized that the ones
[186] who had suppressed the people were these landlords, not the landlords of one particular nationality, and certainly not any nationality as a whole..." (Sinkiang Jih-pao, January 24, 1953).

668 This is an excellent example of the way the Communists carry
565 the class struggle across nationality lines. They substitute class
186 hatred for national hatred.

2) "The second stage of land reform in Shu-le County, Sinkiang,
668 involved 20 hsiang and lasted 78 days from December 12, 1952, to
423 March 3, 1953... In these 20 hsiang (during the land reform) we have developed 859 'positive elements,' an average of more than forty people in each hsiang. This laid the foundation for further works....

"Before the confiscation, we called in the rich farmers, the small land lessors and religious leaders for discussion meetings. In these meetings we explained the policy of preserving 'rich farmer economy' and 'freedom of religious belief.' In execution, we definitely carried out the government's policy toward the mosques. Besides leaving strictly alone the land originally owned by the mosques, through consultation between the mosques and the farmers associations, we left a reasonable amount of land to the mosques which had lost their land through confiscation. In the bazaar, we called meetings of businessmen. There we propagated one step forward the policy of protecting business. Throughout the confiscation we did not touch business owned by the landlords.

"We strengthened the work of the United Front. Through the upper level, the religious leaders and people with high prestige and influence among the local mass, we promoted the propaganda of our policy. Hence we avoided the fear psychology which had spread among the landlords to a certain extent. During the confiscation, we firmly carried out the policy of discrimination. We carried out struggled against landlords who stubbornly resisted,

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attempts of the native peoples to throw off the Chinese yoke and to set up their own government, a story of intrigue and bloodshed, set against the backdrop of international rivalry.

In the past thirty years, superimposed on the political and international complex of Sinkiang were the new ideas that have added fuel to the discords and discontent in Sinkiang. Generally, the more important of the new ideologies injected into the political life of Sinkiang were the following:

1. Policy of assimilation, generally denounced by its enemies as the Great Hanism (Ta-Han chu-i), in which the border peoples were regarded as descendants of an ancient Great Chinese race and should be reabsorbed into the Chinese race. This concept was pushed by the Kuomintang extremists.
2. Program of cultural diversity and cultural autonomy. This idea was pushed by men such as Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Chang Chih-chung, as an alternative to the policy of compulsory assimilation.
3. Pan-Turkestanism and Pan-Islamism, promoted by the native people, especially by the Uighurs and their Kazakh allies, stressed the fact that the majority of people of Sinkiang speak Turkic language and belong to the Moslem faith. The exponents of this concept belong to many shades of political opinion, from the moderates such as Maksud Sabri, Burkhan Shahidi, and Mehmet Emin Bughra, to the more radical faction which included Akhmejan Kasimi, Saifuddin Azizi, and the members of the Kulja coalition.
4. Territorial and cultural autonomy under the principle of federalism based on ideas derived from the Soviet policy towards the minority nationalities. This policy was actively propagandized by the Chinese Communists and served to inflame the native peoples as well as to embarrass the Nationalist authorities.

These divergent views, in substance, were the expressions of nationalism on the part of the Chinese and on the part of the native peoples of Chinese Turkestan, especially among the educated classes. As in many other parts of the Orient, the game of politics was not a popular one. The people, downtrodden and persecuted, desired only to be left alone, and they rose in revolt only when tyranny and injustice became intolerable, and they would then follow the cue of their leaders in wholesale uprisings. In the wars of the Oirats against the Ch'ing government two hundred years ago, the leaders were the tribal chieftains; and in the rebellion of the Khojas and the Dungan rebellion in the last century, the leaders were religious prelates. But in republican times, there were few of the hereditary tribal princes or religious leaders taking a part. Instead, the leaders were drawn from the ranks of the bandits, officers in the Chinese army, or young intellectuals who had studied in China or abroad. On the part of the Chinese, the men in political life in the Northwest were either local civil and military officials, or officials sent out by the central government.

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175 places. For instance, during the first two or three years of the
625 Republic, when Sinkiang was controlled by the governor Yang Tseng-hsin, numerous local officials lost their lives in local riots. However, Yang built up a police force efficient enough to maintain peace and order for almost two decades, a record much better than that of the average warlords who controlled other provinces during
S the same period. However, Yang finally was assassinated. Later,
[177] when another ambitious man, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, controlled Sinkiang, he developed a modern police system patterned after the Soviet secret police. Purge after purge made Sinkiang a police state, though people had to give credit to Sheng for his efficiency in maintaining public order. With the removal of Sheng, this police force declined and the province gradually fell into a chaotic situation again.

S
N B. Problems of Managing Diverse Groups
184 Managing the different ethnic groups was a common problem
577 throughout the Northwest, but it was especially serious in Sinkiang where more than a dozen different peoples lived. The problem can be viewed in terms of the different moral standards which were the result of their different cultural patterns and their historical and geographical backgrounds. For instance, among the Chinese, to
S give shelter overnight to a stranger is a favor, not an obligation.
N But according to V.A. Riasanovsky: Customary Law of the Mongol
[671] Tribes, p. 88, among the Mongols, refusal to give shelter for the
674 night is a crime. Obviously over the barren, bitter cold desert and steppe refusal to grant shelter may mean life or death to a wandering traveller, while among the Chinese agricultural society it was
S usually only an inconvenience. Among the Moslems, Muhammad Ali
N in The Religion of Islam, p. 759, reports that it is believed that
681 people are equal before God, so that punishment must be inflicted
184 without respect of persons. On the contrary, the Mongols pay much
674 respect to their leaders. Riasanovsky op. cit., p. 93, states: "The punishment changes not only with respect to the object, but also with respect to the subject of the crime: there is no equality before
S the law." Hence, ibid., p. 88, "for the murder (with arson) of a
N nobleman the punishment is ruin (confiscation of all properties);
[565] of a man of the middle class -- 300 animals, 30 valuable things; of a man of the lower class -- 15 times nine animals and one valuable thing." Adultery and rape are serious crimes among the
N Chinese. However, the Tibetans, according to Robert B. Ekvall:
681 Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibetan Border, p. 11, permit
184 more freedom in sexual intercourse than most people. Theft is
674 punished by the Mongolian laws, Riasanovsky, op. cit., p. 91, reports, especially if a third theft, the punishment for which is ruin. But to the Tibetans "a crime is determined by the position of the one against whom it is committed. Robbery of a stranger is laudable; robbery of another Tibetan is serious only if he is powerful